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“DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN”:
THE RECOURSE TO BIOLOGY BY OPPONENTS
OF TRANSGENDER EQUALITY*
SHANNON PRICE MINTER**
This Article explores striking parallels between the current battle to
secure equality for transgender people and the prior battle to win
marriage equality for same-sex couples. In both instances, the
success of the marriage and transgender equality movements came
only after years of judicial losses and depended heavily on two
profound changes: increasing judicial and legislative acceptance of
gender equality; as well as increasing social acceptance of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and, more recently, transgender people. As a result of
those changes, defenders of state marriage bans were unable to rely
on gender stereotypes or arguments about the pathology or
immorality of gay people, since those arguments lacked credibility
in most courts. Instead, they turned to biology, seeking to justify the
restriction of marriage to different-sex couples as merely a neutral,
nondiscriminatory reflection of the biological differences involved
in procreation. While those arguments enjoyed some initial success,
most courts—including the U.S. Supreme Court—ultimately
rejected them as circular, concluding that the marriage bans were
discriminatory and not simply the reflection of “natural” facts.
Today, opponents of transgender equality are reviving that failed
strategy. Rather than seeking to justify differential treatment of
transgender people, they are once again invoking biology to argue
that laws excluding transgender persons from shared restrooms
merely reflect neutral biological differences between men and
women, not a deliberate intention to discriminate. This Article
predicts that just as biology-based arguments failed to shield
marriage bans from meaningful judicial review in the past, the
courts will again recognize that these renewed appeals to biology
are circular and do not supply a principled basis for excluding
transgender persons from full and equal participation in the public
sphere—including access to the same restrooms used by others.
* © 2017 Shannon Price Minter. The quotation in the title has been attributed to Yogi
Berra. See Yogisms, YOGI BERRA MUSEUM & LEARNING CTR., https://yogiberramuseum.org
/just-for-fun/yogisms/ [https://perma.cc/T3GL-SANB].
** Legal Director, National Center for Lesbian Rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, biological arguments have been used to justify many
different types of discrimination, from slavery1 to coverture2 to the
forced sterilization of people with disabilities.3 In recent years, those
1. See Christian B. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, 20 WASH. &
LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 341, 355 (2014) (“Science was relied upon to provide ‘objective’ and
‘empirical’ validation of the biological inferiority of non-white persons in order to classify
slaves as less than human, and thus not entitled to social equality.”).
2. Mary L. Heen, From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance on Lives, 23
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 335, 371–74 (2011) (describing the influence of biology-based
arguments about women’s role in childbearing on the persistence of sex discrimination against
both married women and women of childbearing age in insurance law).
3. See Alfred Brophy & Elizabeth Troutman, The Eugenics Movement in North
Carolina, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1871, 1878–86 (2016) (describing genetic arguments, including a
belief in “the supposed inheritance of mental deficiency,” used to justify sterilization in North
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seeking to exclude same-sex couples from marriage also invoked
biological arguments. In cases challenging state marriage bans, state
officials and others argued that the bans did not discriminate against
same-sex couples, but rather simply reflected their inability to procreate
biologically.4 Ultimately, such arguments failed. In 2015, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that same-sex couples must be permitted to marry
on the same terms and conditions as others, recognizing “that new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality
within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged.”5 In reaching that historic conclusion, the Court rejected
the notion that biology was a sufficient justification for the harms
imposed on same-sex couples and their children by discriminatory
marriage laws.
Today, those who oppose transgender equality are once again
appealing to biology to support exclusionary laws and policies—in this
case, laws and policies that isolate transgender people and treat them
differently than others. Biology-based arguments have come to
dominate opposition to the equal inclusion of transgender people in
workplaces, schools, and other public arenas—and particularly in public
restrooms.6 On this view, restricting access to restrooms based on a
person’s “biological sex” is warranted by the physiological differences
between men and women.7 Because many transgender individuals retain
physical characteristics (including genitalia) typically associated with
their sex at birth, proponents of this view believe that permitting a
transgender person to use the same restrooms as others would disrupt
that biological framework, calling the continued existence of gendersegregated restrooms into question.8

Carolina and across the country); Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally
Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 122, 160–63 (1993) (discussing rationalizations
for forced sterilizations of individuals with disabilities).
4. See infra notes 120–28 and accompanying text.
5. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
6. See generally Terry S. Kogan, Public Restrooms and the Distorting of Transgender
Identity, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) (providing an overview of the history surrounding sexseparated bathrooms and discussing the use of such biology-based arguments within the
context of litigation challenging a North Carolina law requiring transgender persons to use
restrooms corresponding to the gender listed on their birth certificates).
7. See id. (manuscript at 111–17); DALE O’LEARY & PETER SPRIGG, FAMILY RES.
COUNCIL, ISSUE ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE TRANSGENDER
MOVEMENT 5–6 (2015), http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF15F45.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5W2T3CV].
8. See O’LEARY & SPRIGG, supra note 7, at 7 (“A person’s sex (male or female) is an
immutable biological reality. In the vast majority of people (including those who later identify
as ‘transgender’), it is unambiguously identifiable at birth.”).
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This Article discusses similarities in the arguments used to oppose
marriage by same-sex couples and the current arguments of those who
oppose equality for transgender people. Like the biology-based claims
previously used by marriage equality opponents, these arguments seek
to insulate discrimination against transgender people from meaningful
scrutiny by claiming that any such discrimination merely reflects neutral
biological differences between men and women. Although initially
successful, biology-based rationales for excluding same-sex couples from
marriage were eventually rejected by most courts, including the
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges.9 For similar reasons, it is likely
that most courts will also ultimately reject such justifications for policies
that exclude transgender people from full participation in public life—as
they should. By examining the remarkable parallels between the
recourse to biology in these two debates, this Article highlights the
principal failings of the current justifications for unequal treatment of
transgender people.
Especially in the last decade, the struggle for marriage equality
achieved unprecedented public visibility, often dominating the national
news.10 The struggle to win marriage equality for same-sex couples took
many years and the efforts of millions of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (“LGBT”) advocates, allies, and ordinary individuals who
made the courageous choice to come out and share their lives with
family members, coworkers, and friends. Although LGBT people faced
other issues of discrimination and violence, for a variety of reasons,
marriage became the primary focus of legal and political debate.11 The
9. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
10. See, e.g., Leigh M. Moscowitz, Gay Marriage in Television News: Voice and Visual
Representation in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 24, 24–25 (2010) (discussing how as early as 2003 “[t]he topic of gay marriage quickly
became front-page news”); Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the Law,
Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 89 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 143, 181 (2015) (attributing increased support for marriage equality to “media
attention generated by marriage litigation”); Same-Sex Marriage Dominates Conversation in
the Blogosphere, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.journalism.org/2009/04/16
/samesex-marriage-dominates-conversation-blogosphere/ [https://perma.cc/8JJS-F4XV] (noting
that in a five-day span twenty-six percent of posts on blogs and social media sites focused on
marriage equality); see also Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/samesex-marriage-civil-unions-anddomestic-partnerships?action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&module=RelatedCoverage
&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/74AH-8Z5R (staff-uploaded
archive)] (archiving New York Times articles about same-sex marriage).
11. See, e.g., Hailey Branson-Potts, LGBT Activists Say the Fight Doesn’t End at
Marriage, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-melgbt-activism-20150712-story.html [https://perma.cc/7HJA-YHWY] (describing efforts to
achieve marriage equality as “a broad unifying force,” and how after success at the Supreme
Court, activists can shift their focus to other issues); Evan Wolfson, Why It Matters, FREEDOM
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stakes of that struggle were high, as marriage increasingly came to be
seen by both sides as a litmus test of whether same-sex couples and their
families would be accepted as equal members of our society.12
Today, efforts to win equality for transgender people have come to
play a similarly central role in our nation’s political imagination. Just as
legislative and judicial debates over same-sex couples and marriage once
dominated the headlines, thousands of news stories about transgender
issues now flood media outlets, with new stories and opinion pieces
appearing every day.13 On conservative radio and internet outlets,
commentators seek to mobilize conservative donors and voters by
depicting legal protections for transgender people as a dangerous
“assault on the sexes.”14 In the past two years alone, state legislators
introduced scores of anti-transgender bills.15 In North Carolina,
TO MARRY (Jan. 2016), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/why-it-matters [https://perma
.cc/RU94-5875].
12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606 (recognizing that a decision denying same-sex
couples the freedom to marry “would teach the Nation that these laws are in accord with our
society’s most basic compact” and thus would inflict serious “[d]ignitary” harms); Brief of
Amici Curiae Cato Institute, William N. Eskridge Jr., and Steven Calabresi in Support of
Petitioners at 32–33, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571,
14-574) (arguing that a refusal to recognize same-sex couples’ freedom to marry would mark
them as inferior and impede their integration as equal citizens).
13. These stories range from coverage of proposed legislation and legal cases to human
interest stories. See, e.g., Associated Press, Montana Won’t Get Statewide Vote on Transgender
Bathrooms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 27, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://www.usnews.com
/news/best-states/montana/articles/2017-03-27/montana-lawmakers-vote-against-transgenderbathroom-bill [https://perma.cc/P67M-69WR]; Korin Miller, Meet the First Transgender Bride
Featured on ‘Say Yes to the Dress’, WOMEN’S HEALTH (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www
.womenshealthmag.com/life/say-yes-to-the-dress-transgender [https://perma.cc/T32HGQAT]; Daniel Weissner, 6th Circuit Says Transgender Woman Can Intervene in EEOC
Case, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/employmenttransgender-idUSL2N1H41M1 [https://perma.cc/9MD4-KC4W].
14. O’LEARY & SPRIGG, supra note 8, at 1. For example, in April 2016, Target
announced that it was adopting a non-discrimination policy permitting transgender customers
to use Target’s restrooms based on their gender identity. Continuing to Stand for Inclusivity,
TARGET (Apr. 19, 2016), https://corporate.target.com/article/2016/04/target-stands-inclusivity
[https://perma.cc/ZUF8-J3RS]. In response, conservative groups mounted a nationwide
boycott of Target’s stores. Khorri Atkinson, Conservative Group Calls for Target Boycott over
Transgender Bathroom Policy, MSNBC (Apr. 22, 2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.com
/msnbc/conservative-group-calls-target-boycott-over-transgender-bathroom-policy [https://
perma.cc/YX34-9KGE].
15. E.g., H.B. 364, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016); S.F. 3002, 89th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2016); H.B. 2215, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015); A.B. 469, 2015 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2015); Stephen Peters, New HRC Report Reveals Unprecedented Onslaught of State
Legislation Targeting Transgender Americans, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Feb. 22, 2016), http://
www.hrc.org/blog/new-hrc-report-reveals-unprecedented-onslaught-of-state-legislation-targeti
[https://perma.cc/B9NV-55SZ] (“In 2015, at least 125 anti-LGBT bills were introduced in state
houses all across the country. Twenty-one specifically targeted transgender people, though
none became law.”).
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legislators enacted the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (“H.B.
2”), a law that purported to override federal protections for transgender
employees and students.16 These federal protections require that
employers and schools treat transgender persons equally, including by
permitting them to use the same restrooms as others.17 Instead, H.B. 2
mandated that transgender persons use restroom and locker room
facilities based on their “biological sex[,]” which the law defined as the
sex designated “on a person’s birth certificate.”18 In Mississippi, the
16. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (H.B. 2), secs. 1.2–.3, §§ 115C-521.2, 142-760,
2016-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis), repealed by An Act to Reset S.L. 2016-3 (H.B.
142), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (requiring transgender persons to use restrooms according to
their biological sex as identified in their birth certificate).
17. These federal laws primarily include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-8 (2012), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681. Many federal appellate courts have held that Title VII protects transgender
employees. See Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 884 (11th Cir.
2016) (“Sex discrimination includes discrimination against a transgender person for gender
nonconformity.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly,
discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex
discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City
of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex stereotyping based on a person’s
gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination . . . .”); Rosa v. Park W.
Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that transgender persons are
protected under federal sex discrimination laws); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–
03 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Lusardi, No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756, at *8 (EEOC
Apr. 1, 2015) (holding that Title VII requires employers to treat transgender workers equally
in all respects, including permitting them to use the same restrooms used by others). Similarly,
a number of federal courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have held that Title IX protects
transgender students. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715
(4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755; Whitaker
v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136940, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2016); Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131474, at *34–51 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016). In Grimm, after granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case back to the Fourth
Circuit for reconsideration after the Department of Education and Department of Justice
withdrew its guidance providing that Title IX requires schools to permit transgender students
to use the same public restrooms as other students, consistent with their gender identity.
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755,
at *1.
18. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (H.B. 2), sec. 1.2–.3, §§ 115C-521.2, 143-760,
2016-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 1–2. In response to H.B. 2, a number of businesses and
organizations, including the NCAA, announced that they would cease doing business or
holding sporting events in North Carolina, resulting in the loss of an estimated $3.76 billion of
revenue to the state. Associated Press, Bathroom Bill to Cost North Carolina $3.76 Billion,
CNBC (Mar. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/bathroom-bill-to-costnorth-carolina-376-billion.html [https://perma.cc/3689-5HJN]. On March 30, 2017, North
Carolina Governor Roy Cooper signed into law H.B. 142, a law that repealed H.B. 2, but
effectively left its restrictions on restroom usage by transgender persons in place. An Act to
Reset S.L. 2016-3, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __; see Craig Jarvis, With HB2 Repeal, NC Still an
Outlier, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 2, 2017, 1:12 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news
/politics-government/state-politics/article142260859.html [https://perma.cc/334F-2QYT];

95 N.C. L. REV. 1161 (2017)

2017]

TRANSGENDER EQUALITY

1167

legislature enacted the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from
Government Discrimination Act (“H.B. 1523”), a law that created an
extremely broad religious exemption, applicable to virtually any state
law, for persons who believe that the terms “man” or “woman” “refer to
an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by
anatomy and genetics at time of birth.”19
As these examples illustrate, much of the current focus on
transgender issues centers on restrooms. Indeed, just as the freedom to
marry became the public focus of equality for lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people, the freedom to use restrooms based on one’s gender identity has
now become the public focus of equality for transgender persons. Unlike
the focus on marriage, however, which was driven in significant part by
the choice of LGBT advocates to prioritize the issue, the current
centrality of restrooms in the battle for transgender equality has been
the result of a concerted effort by conservative public officials and
groups, who have forced this issue to the forefront through aggressive
legislation and litigation.20
In the past year, litigation about transgender people and restrooms
has exploded, resulting in a flurry of cases challenging laws and policies
that permit transgender people to use the same restrooms as others. In
May 2016, Texas and eleven other states filed a federal lawsuit seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of federal agency guidance stating that federal
sex discrimination laws require equal treatment of transgender students
and workers with respect to restrooms and other sex-separated

Matthew Burns & Laura Leslie, HB2 Repealed, But Many Unhappy with “Reset”, WRAL
(Mar. 30, 2016, 10:05 PM), http://www.wral.com/hb2-repealed-but-many-unhappy-with-reset/16615133/ [https://perma.cc/7RWP-Z9K2]. The ACLU has indicated that it will continue its
lawsuit challenging H.B. 2, noting that its “legal team will seek to amend the lawsuit to
challenge H.B. 142 as well.” Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and LAMBDA
Condemn ‘Fake’ Repeal of HB2 (March 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-andlambda-legal-condemn-fake-repeal-hb-2 [https://perma.cc/PA65-CC7L].
19. Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, ch. 3334,
§ 2, 2016 Miss. Laws 427, 428. On June 30, 2016, a federal district court judge held that H.B.
1523 was unconstitutional and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining its enforcement.
Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 723–24 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2016), appeal docketed, No.
16-60478 (5th Cir. July 8, 2016). The district court subsequently denied the state’s motion to
stay the ruling pending appeal, which was later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Barber v. Bryant,
Nos. 3:16-CV-417-CWR-LRA, 3:16-CV-442-CWR-LRA, 2016 WL 4096726, at *3 (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 833 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2016). As of this writing, this case is on appeal
before the Fifth Circuit. Barber v. Bryant, No. 16-60478 (5th Cir. July 8, 2016).
20. Associated Press, Bathroom Laws Spurring Transgender Americans to Organize, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 3, 2016, 3:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bathroom-laws-spurringtransgender-americans-to-organize/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ3-2PCH] (noting that “transgender
rights has supplanted same-sex marriage as the most volatile, high-profile issue for the
broader movement of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender activists”).
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facilities.21 In August 2016, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction blocking the enforcement of the guidance nationwide.22 Two
weeks after Texas filed suit, a second group of states filed a similar
lawsuit in Nebraska.23 Across the country, the same conservative
organizations that once sought to intervene in lawsuits to defend state
marriage bans are filing cases challenging the adoption of
nondiscrimination policies for transgender students by public schools,
claiming that such policies endanger the privacy and safety of other
students.24
21. Texas v. United States, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __, 2016 WL 4426495, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 21, 2016); see U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Letter on
Transgender Students 3 (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters
/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4E3-QVDS].
22. Texas v. United States, __ F. Supp. 3d at __, 2016 WL 4426495, at *17; see Texas v.
United States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016)
(clarifying scope of nationwide injunction). Notably, however, because the Fourth Circuit had
already issued a decision deferring to the Department of Education guidance, the federal
district court presiding over the challenge to H.B. 2 in North Carolina declined to follow this
ruling, relying instead on the Fourth Circuit’s holding in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
County School Board. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 635 (M.D.N.C. 2016). The
Fourth Circuit’s decision has since been vacated by the Supreme Court. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755, at *1.
23. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Nebraska v. United States,
No. 4:16-cv-03117 (D. Neb. July 8, 2016). The complaint was filed by Nebraska, Arkansas,
Kansas, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. Id.; see also Daniel Wiessner, More States Sue Obama Administration over
Transgender Directive, REUTERS (July 8, 2016, 6:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-lgbt-lawsuit-idUSKCN0ZO2B [https://perma.cc/W3EM-QY76].
24. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16cv-00524, 2016 WL 5372349, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016); Verified Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ¶ 213, at 32, Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 1:16-cv-04945 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016), 2016 WL 2591322. An Ohio school district,
represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom (“ADF”), filed suit challenging nondiscrimination policies. See Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 5372349, at
*1; Associated Press, Ohio Judge Orders Girls’ Bathroom Access for Transgender Student,
FOX NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/09/27/ohio-judge-orders-girlsbathroom-access-for-transgender-student.html [https://perma.cc/M9LN-HTUG]. Similarly, in
Illinois, a group of parents and students represented by ADF brought suit challenging the
same policies. See Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra, ¶¶ 1–3, at
*2–3; Dawn Rhodes & Duaa Eldeib, No Decision from Judge on Barring Transgender Student
from Locker Room, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2016, 5:49 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/local/breaking/ct-transgender-lawsuit-palatine-met-20160815-story.html [https://perma.cc/9A93R8FT]. A magistrate judge recently recommended that the district court deny the plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction. Students v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945,
2016 WL 6134121, at *40 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016). ADF is also representing a group of
students bringing similar claims in Minnesota. See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Privacy Matters v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. at 63–66, No. 0:16-cv-03015-WMWLIB (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2016), 2016 WL 4691526; Associated Press, Minnesota School District
Sued over Transgender Bathroom Policy, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Sept. 9, 2016, 3:00
PM), http://www.twincities.com/2016/09/09/minnesota-school-district-sued-over-transgenderbathroom-policy/ [https://perma.cc/UG4U-3HWH].
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Whether and when the Supreme Court may step in to resolve this
issue remains unclear. In October 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to
review the Fourth Circuit’s decision in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
County School Board.25 As the first federal appellate court to address the
issue, the Fourth Circuit held that the guidance issued by the
Department of Education and Department of Justice requiring that
transgender students must be permitted to use the same restrooms as
other students was entitled to deference.26 On remand, the district court
struck down a Virginia school district’s policy barring Gavin Grimm, a
transgender boy, from using the same restrooms as other boys.27 The
school district petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the Court agreed to hear the case to decide two questions: whether
federal courts must defer to the agencies’ guidance on this issue and
whether, regardless of the deference owed to the guidance, the
department’s position that Title IX protects transgender students is
“reasonable.”28 Shortly after the election of Donald Trump, however,
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice withdrew
the guidance.29 In response, the Court reversed course, vacating the
Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanding the case back to the Fourth
Circuit for “further consideration in light of the guidance document
issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice[.]”30
In the face of this accelerating onslaught of hostile legislation and
litigation, transgender advocates have been forced to confront
arguments claiming that laws and policies that exclude transgender
persons from using communal restrooms consistent with their gender
identity are justified by the biological differences between men and
women. With the possibility that a case involving this issue might reach
the Supreme Court in the near future, the pressure to respond to these
arguments has become even greater, given the possibility that an adverse
ruling by the Court could set back the pace of progress for transgender
people for decades. Moreover, because federal courts construe the term
25. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
26. Id. at 721; see U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 21.
27. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721–23; G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., No. 4:15-cv-00054, 2016 WL 3581852, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2016).
28. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.)
(granting certiorari on questions two and three); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, G.G. ex
rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 16-273, (U.S. Aug. 29, 2016).
29. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Letter on Withdrawal of Title
IX Guidance Documents 1–2 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file
/941551/download [https://perma.cc/4XHQ-VGVU].
30. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL
855755, at *1.
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“sex” consistently across federal sex discrimination laws,31 a Supreme
Court case resolving this issue under any federal sex discrimination law
would reverberate in other areas, ranging from employment to
education, housing, credit, gender-based violence, and other arenas.
As explored below, the fate of similar biology-based arguments in
cases challenging state marriage bans is instructive and suggests that
while such arguments may have some initial success, courts are
ultimately unlikely to accept biology as a sufficient justification for
differential treatment of transgender people. Part I highlights the
prominent role of biology-based arguments in litigation challenging state
marriage bans and explains why courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, ultimately rejected those arguments as circular and unpersuasive.
Part II examines the resurgence of biology-based arguments in litigation
about transgender equality and argues that courts are likely to—and
should—reject them for similar reasons in this new context as well.
I. WHY BIOLOGY-BASED ARGUMENTS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE
IN THE MARRIAGE EQUALITY DEBATE
The Supreme Court’s 2015 Obergefell decision, which struck down
state laws barring same-sex couples from marriage, was the culmination
of an extraordinary shift in the legal and social position of gay people in
the United States.32 This Part examines how that decision—issued a
mere twelve years after the Court held that states may not criminalize
same-sex intimacy33—was made possible by two other profound changes:
the Court’s embrace of gender equality and elimination of gender-based
discrimination in marriage; and the growing social acceptance of lesbian,
gay, and bisexual people. Those changes limited the arguments that state
officials and others could use to defend state marriage bans, effectively
eliminating justifications based on overt gender stereotypes or on
condemnation of same-sex relationships. As a result, those defending
the bans sought to portray them as a mere reflection of the biological,
sex-based differences involved in procreation, rather than as measures
intentionally designed to exclude same-sex couples.34 Initially, some
courts accepted those arguments.35 In the long run, however, most
courts—including the Supreme Court—rejected biology-based

31. See Shane T. Muñoz & David M. Kalteux, LGBT, the EEOC, and the Meaning of Sex,
90 FL. BAR J. 43, 44–46 (2016).
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
34. See infra notes 120–35 and accompanying text.
35. See infra text accompanying note 129.
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rationales as circular and required states to justify their discriminatory
treatment of same-sex couples, which they were unable to do.36
A.

“The Stunning Velocity of the Marriage Equality Movement”37

In hindsight, the speed with which courts recognized same-sex
couples’ freedom to marry was breathtaking.38 For most of the twentieth
century, being lesbian or gay was treated as a mental illness.39 In 2003,
when the Supreme Court finally struck down state laws criminalizing
same-sex intimacy,40 not a single state permitted same-sex couples to
marry; only a handful provided any form of statewide relationship
recognition for such couples; and a significant minority still treated
intimacy between same-sex partners as a crime.41 Nonetheless, a mere
twelve years later, in 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that every state
must permit same-sex couples to marry “on the same terms and
conditions as marriage between persons of the opposite sex.”42 As one
reporter noted in 2014, “[t]he direction and pace of the marriage
decisions—their sheer velocity—is unlike any other debate in modern
politics or the law.”43

36. See infra text accompanying notes 129–33.
37. Chris Geidner, The Stunning Velocity of the Marriage Equality Movement,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:55 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/thestunning-velocity-of-the-marriage-equality-movement?utm_term=.xd6Zxq0nY#.mtdx4EKV2
[https://perma.cc/MY87-742X].
38. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Change Doesn’t Usually Come This Fast, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(June 26, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/change-doesnt-usually-come-thisfast/ [https://perma.cc/2WKY-LJWQ] (“In the United States, gay marriage has gone from
unthinkable to the law of the land in just a couple of decades.”).
39. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 21, 50 (2010) (“Psychoanalysts in the 1930s viewed homosexuality as a
psychiatric problem. The first [DSM-I] catalogued homosexuality as a form of psychopathic
personality disorder. In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality
from the list of sociopathic mental disorders but developed a new classification of ‘sexual
orientation disturbance,’ later called ‘ego-dystonic homosexuality.’ It was not until 1986—
little more than two decades ago—that this category was finally removed from the DSMIIIR.”).
40. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
41. Id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Just a few short years before Lawrence, Vermont
became the first state to provide limited relationship recognition for same-sex couples. Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). Massachusetts was the first state permitting same-sex
couples to marry just five months after Lawrence was decided. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
42. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
43. Geidner, supra note 37. In remarks at the University of Minnesota law school the
same month, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly referred to the “remarkable” shift in
public perception about same-sex couples, which she attributed to the greater openness of gay
people: “Having people close to us say who they are—that made the attitude change in this
country.” Associated Press, Ginsburg Talks Gay Marriage, POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:04
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The marriage equality movement began with a series of state court
challenges to marriage bans. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii in
Baehr v. Lewin44 became the first court in the country to call the
constitutionality of a state marriage ban into question.45 Although later
reversed by Hawaiian voters,46 that ruling marked a significant turning
point in the effort to achieve marriage equality. After Hawaii, a growing
number of state courts invalidated laws barring same-sex couples from
marriage on state constitutional grounds, starting with the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 2003.47 Despite early losses in Maryland,48
New York,49 and Washington,50 state courts across the country
eventually followed Massachusetts’ lead. New Jersey’s ban was partially
struck down in 2006,51 followed by victories for same-sex couples in
California and Connecticut in 2008,52 and in Iowa in 2009.53 In
California, voters soon reversed that initial victory by enacting
Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to create an
exception to the state’s equal protection clause in order to once again
exclude same-sex couples from marriage.54 Nonetheless, the prior ruling
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/supreme-court-gay-marriage-ruth-baderginsburg-111032 [https://perma.cc/P96Z-CY9N].
44. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
45. Id. at 50.
46. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. In 1998, Hawaii voters amended their state constitution to
permit discrimination against same-sex couples in marriage. See Mike Yuen, ‘Yes’ Won with
Focus, Clear Message, STAR-BULLETIN (Nov. 5, 1988), http://archives.starbulletin.com/98/11
/05/news/story4.html [https://perma.cc/4LL6-A2QD] (discussing the “overwhelming approval
of a constitutional amendment that [gave] the Legislature the power to outlaw same-sex
marriages in Hawaii”).
47. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N. E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
48. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 586 (Md. 2007), opinion extended after remand, No.
24-C-04-005390, 2008 WL 3999843 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 2008) (rejecting challenge to
Maryland’s law barring same-sex couples from marriage).
49. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the “New York
Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex”).
50. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (holding that
provisions of Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act prohibiting marriage by same-sex
couples did not violate the state constitution).
51. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006) (holding that “committed same-sex
couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married
opposite-sex couples”).
52. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding that statutory language
“limiting the designation of marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ is
unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute” (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a))),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5 (2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
53. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
54. See CAL. ATT’Y GEN., CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 54 (2008), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov2008-principal.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF26-7Z62] (providing a summary and text of Proposition
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by the Supreme Court of California tipped the balance for other state
courts. After that decision, advocates for marriage equality never lost
another case in a state supreme court.55 Moreover, Proposition 8
galvanized LGBT advocates and allies across the country, ultimately
strengthening the political and legal movement for marriage equality.56
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court prompted yet another wave of
new litigation, this time in federal courts. In United States v. Windsor,57
the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
which had denied married same-sex couples all of the federal rights and
protections given to other married persons.58 Windsor unleashed an
avalanche of federal court challenges to remaining state marriage bans.
Across the country, from Alabama to Idaho, federal district courts
began concluding that state laws barring same-sex couples from
marriage failed to serve any legitimate governmental interest and struck
them down.59 In many cases, state officials agreed, declining to defend
state marriage bans and, in some cases, even urging courts to invalidate
them.60 The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits quickly affirmed
8); Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 5, 2008, 10:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122586056759900673 [https://
perma.cc/AM7N-HKV4 (staff-uploaded archive)].
55. See Shannon Minter, California Dreaming: Winning Marriage Equality in the
California Courts, in LOVE UNITES US: WINNING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY IN AMERICA
145, 145 (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016) (discussing California’s road
to marriage equality and court decisions that followed California’s lead).
56. See Kate Kendell, This Changes Everything, in LOVE UNITES US, supra note 55, at
168, 170. Proposition 8 brought together over eighty organizations that mobilized to defeat the
measure. See id. Additionally, the mobilization surrounding Proposition 8 enlisted the support
of an unlikely ally, conservative attorney Ted Olson. Later, Olson was joined by his former
adversary David Boies. See Jo Becker, A Conservative’s Road to Same-Sex Marriage
Advocacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/us/19olson.html
[https://perma.cc/UKD4-87EE].
57. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
58. Id. at 2682.
59. See, e.g., Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1290–91 (S.D. Ala. 2015); Latta v.
Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086–87 (D. Idaho), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Tom Watts,
Note, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle For Marriage Equality Continued, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y S52, S72 (2015) (noting that during this period twenty-two federal district courts
and four circuit courts ruled in favor of same-sex couples challenging state marriage bans,
while only two district courts and one circuit court upheld such bans).
60. See Nigel Duara & Jonathan J. Cooper, Oregon Won’t Defend Gay-Marriage Ban in
Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news
/oregon-wont-defend-gay-marriage-ban-in-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/M7TE-GN5T]; Juliet
Eilperin, Pa. Attorney General Says She Won’t Defend State’s Gay Marriage Ban, WASH.
POST (July 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/07/11
/sources-pa-attorney-general-wont-defend-states-gay-marriage-ban/ [https://perma.cc/ZU8BY6BF]; Ed Vogel, Nevada Officials Won’t Defend Gay Marriage Ban, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Feb. 12, 2014, 6:45 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/1173evada-officials-won-tdefend-gay-marriage-ban [https://perma.cc/Z7CB-JSMS].
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the decisions below on appeal, bringing marriage equality to more than
twenty-two states.61 When the Sixth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to uphold state marriage bans,62 the U.S. Supreme Court
stepped in to resolve the issue for the entire country. In Obergefell v.
Hodges, the Court struck down marriage bans in Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, and Tennessee, holding that same-sex couples have the same
fundamental freedom to marry as others.63 Reversing the Sixth Circuit,
which had accepted biology as a legitimate justification for limiting
marriage to different-sex couples, the Court concluded that “many
same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children,
whether biological or adopted,” and that discriminatory “marriage
laws . . . harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”64
B.

Doctrinal and Social Predicates of Change

Two reasons U.S. courts embraced marriage equality claims so
quickly stand out. First, by the time the Hawaii Supreme Court set the
stage for Obergefell in 1993, the legal institution of marriage had already
undergone an enormous and far more significant change than that
required by permitting same-sex couples to marry—namely, the
elimination of all other gender-based distinctions within marriage.65
Because of that profound change, advocates for marriage equality could
persuasively argue that permitting same-sex couples to marry would
require no substantive changes in existing marriage laws, which already
treated both spouses equally regardless of sex. In addition, by 1993, the

61. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265
(2014) (mem.); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308
(2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Idaho v.
Latta, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015) (mem.); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (W.D. Wis.
2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316
(2014) (mem.).
62. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
64. Id. at 2600–01.
65. See Amber Bailey, Redefining Marriage: How the Institution of Marriage Has
Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 305, 314–20
(2012) (describing the elimination of gender-based marriage laws in the United States). The
elimination of gender-based distinctions in marriage took place over centuries, transforming
marriage from a legal institution largely defined by gender and the presumed
complementarity of men’s and women’s legal and social roles to an institution in which gender
no longer plays any formal legal role. See generally Heen, supra note 2, at 344–50 (describing
the influence of the coverture doctrine and its abolition on the treatment of women under
insurance law); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (describing the long history of legal reform required to fully
eliminate the common law rule permitting husbands to “chastise” their wives).
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American Psychiatric Association and other leading mental health
organizations had renounced their prior condemnation of
“homosexuality” as a mental illness or disorder that could be “cured,”66
and public attitudes and beliefs regarding lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people had already become far more positive.67 As a result, legal
arguments based on an outmoded view of gay identity as immoral or
diseased were unlikely to gain much lasting traction. Instead, opponents
of marriage equality were forced to advance less aggressive claims—
ceding same-sex couples’ right to equality, but falling back upon
biological justifications for restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples—that ultimately lacked sufficient credibility or weight to
counteract same-sex couples’ claims to equality, freedom, and respect.68
As explained in Part II, a similar dynamic is now at work in the
debate over transgender persons and restrooms. Those seeking to
defend policies that exclude transgender people from using the same
restrooms as others consistent with their gender identities, increasingly
rely upon biological justifications for such policies rather than attack the
morality or legitimacy of transgender identity directly.69 Just as
opponents of marriage equality invoked biological arguments about
procreation in an attempt to avoid the appearance of bias and to cloak
discriminatory policies in an ostensibly neutral garb, those who oppose

66. Levit, supra note 39, at 50. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association replaced
“homosexuality” with the term with “sexual orientation disturbance,” and later “ego-dystonic
homosexuality” from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”).
The category was completely eliminated from the DSM-IIIR in 1986. Id.
67. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1557 (2004) (“By the middle of the 1990s, [the LGB movement] had gained
considerable political clout, and public acceptance of homosexuality had grown . . . .”).
68. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605; Brief for the Respondents at 46, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-571), 2015 WL 1384104, at *46 [hereinafter Brief for the
Respondents (No. 14-571)] (asserting that “Michigan’s marriage laws are based on biological
complementarity, not sexual orientation”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Idaho Governor C.L.
“Butch” Otter at 9–10, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556) (arguing that
“marriage is principally about children—since the ability to create a child together is what
makes man-woman unions unique”). See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and
Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1478–81 (2013) (describing both the prominence and
the weakness of procreation-based arguments against marriage equality); Edward Stein, The
‘Accidental Procreation’ Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex
Relationships, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 403 (2009) (same). In addition to making biology-based
arguments, opponents of marriage equality also argued that state bans on same-sex marriage
were consistent with a state’s constitutional authority to recognize marriages under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the traditional tenants of federalism. Brief for Respondent at 6–
8, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1384100, at *6–8
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent (No. 14-556)].
69. See infra Section II.E.
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sharing restrooms with transgender people invoke biology to justify
policies that isolate transgender people from others.70
1. The Real Marriage Revolution: Gender Equality
State officials and others defending state marriage bans might have
preferred to argue that gender-based distinctions in marriage are
permissible;71 however, by the time same-sex couples sought the right to
marry in the 1990s, the Supreme Court had already firmly rejected such
distinctions as unconstitutional.72 Indeed, historically, the legal and
social changes wrought by permitting same-sex couples to marry pale in
significance compared to those brought about by gender equality within
marriage. At common law, gender inequality was central to the legal
institution and definition of marriage. In effect, marriage was a legal
institution that required women to give up their separate legal existence
and subordinate themselves to men.73 The law prescribed distinct rights
and responsibilities for each spouse based on gender, giving husbands
virtually unlimited power over their wives and children.74 This gender
dynamic was most pronounced in the doctrine of coverture, which had a
profound impact on marriage law in this country. As William Blackstone
explained, coverture provided that “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband . . . .”75 For most of our nation’s

70. See infra Section II.E.
71. See Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial
Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16–24 (2006). Some advocates defending state
marriage bans did in fact argue that marriage is, and should remain, an inherently gendered
institution based on enduring differences in the social as well as biological roles of men and
women. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 909 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he State asserts public purposes—uniting men and women to
celebrate the ‘complementarity’ (sic) of the sexes and providing male and female role models
for children—based on broad and vague generalizations about the roles of men and women
that reflect outdated sex-role stereotyping.” (alteration in original)); Stewart, supra, at 16–24
(arguing that limiting marriage to male-female couples is justified by the differences between
men and women).
72. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
73. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 487–90 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring)
(describing the “profoundly unequal status of men and women in marriage” under the
common law and for much of our nation’s history); Baker, 744 A.2d at 908 (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the history of the marriage laws in
Vermont); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
11–12 (2000).
74. COTT, supra note 73, at 11–12.
75. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
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history, as a result of the coverture doctrine, the rights and duties of
husbands and wives were distinct.76
In the United States, many states mitigated the most restrictive
aspects of the coverture doctrine, such as the inability of married women
to form valid contracts, through the enactment of Married Women’s
Property Acts and other measures.77 Over time, legislatures and courts
abolished other gender-based aspects of marriage, such as the
requirements that husbands support their wives and that women take a
husband’s last name, the rule barring women from pressing charges
against husbands for assault or rape, and presumptions giving husbands
(and later, wives) automatic preference in child custody disputes, among
other steps towards marital gender equality.78
Among the states, Louisiana was the last to have its so-called “head
and master” law struck down.79 In 1979, a federal district court upheld
Louisiana’s law, which made a husband the “head and master of the
[marital] community.”80 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the law
impermissibly discriminated based on sex and violated the
Constitution’s equal protection clause.81 In 1982, in Kirchberg v.
Feenstra,82 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that holding,
effectively bringing the era of male rule and gender-based distinctions in
marriage to an end.83
Thus, by the time of the Hawaii state court decision in 1993,
marriage had already become a gender-neutral legal institution.84 The
76. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, A Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249, 252 (2006) (noting the “demise of coverture”
occurred prior to the more recent “invalidation of . . . rules that reinforced different roles for
husbands and wives”); Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and the Law of
Marriage, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 205, 207 (2012) (discussing the recent “demise” of many sexbased classifications within marriage).
77. See Bernie D. Jones, Revisiting the Married Women’s Property Acts: Recapturing
Protection in the Face of Equality, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 91, 99 (2013).
78. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–04 (2015) (summarizing these
changes); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down a sex-specific Alabama alimony
law).
79. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 609 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
80. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 430 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D. La. 1977), rev’d, 609 F.2d 727 (5th
Cir. 1979), aff’d, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
81. Kirchberg, 609 F.2d at 730.
82. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
83. Id. at 465.
84. See Bailey, supra note 65, at 331 (showing that, because marriage had already become
a gender-neutral institution, states did not have to make substantive changes to state marriage
laws in order to permit same-sex couples to marry). As a result, those who sought to defend
state marriage bans were effectively foreclosed from making arguments that might
otherwise—in an earlier era—have been persuasive to many judges. For example, at the time
that Richard Baker and James McConnell challenged Minnesota’s marriage ban in 1971, see
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oral argument in Obergefell highlighted the importance of that evolution
for same-sex couples. Justice Ginsburg invoked Kirchberg in a colloquy
with counsel for the State of Michigan, who was defending Michigan’s
ban: “Marriage today,” she noted, “is not what it was under the common
law tradition. Marriage was a relationship of a dominant male to a
subordinate female. That ended as a result of this court’s decision in
1982 when Louisiana’s Head and Master Rule was struck down.”85 As
Justice Ginsburg then pointedly noted: “And no state was allowed to
have such a marriage anymore.”86 The demise of gender-based
distinctions within marriage underscored the irrationality of limiting
marriage only to male-female couples.
Nearly two decades before Obergefell, in the 1999 decision partially
striking down Vermont’s marriage ban on state equal protection
grounds,87 Vermont Supreme Court Justice Denise Johnson made a
similar point. “[H]istorically,” she noted, “the marriage laws imposed
sex-based roles for the partners to a marriage—male provider and
female dependent—that bore no relation to their inherent abilities to
contribute to society.”88 In contrast, “[t]oday, the partners to a marriage
are equal before the law.”89 Viewed in that historical context, she
concluded that “the sex-based classification contained in the marriage
law is simply a vestige of the common law unequal marriage
relationship.”90
After the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsburg continued to stress
the role of Kirchberg and similar cases in laying a foundation for
marriage equality for same-sex couples. In an interview with Gloria
Steinem, she noted:

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971), Minnesota law still assigned some
different rights and responsibilities to spouses based on their sex, see Mary Anne Case,
Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1768 (2005) (“This asymmetry of roles, duties, and
privileges in law, although on the decline since at least the passage of the first Married
Women’s Property Acts in the mid-nineteenth century, remained . . . very much a part of the
legal landscape when Baker and McConnell first applied for a marriage license, and presented
real obstacles to the recognition of their marriage.”).
85. Transcript of Oral Argument at 70–71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments
/argument_transcripts/2014/14-556q1_l5gm.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MVZ-8S3Z].
86. Id.
87. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 908–09 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 908.
89. Id. at 909.
90. Id. at 906; see also Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 487–90 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J.,
concurring) (similarly concluding that state marriage bans impermissibly “seek to preserve an
outmoded, sex-role-based vision of the marriage institution”).
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It’s a facet of the gay rights movement that people don’t think
about enough. Why suddenly marriage equality? Because it wasn’t
until 1981 that the court struck down Louisiana’s “head and
master rule,” that the husband was head and master of the house.
Marriage was a relationship between the dominant, breadwinning
husband and the subordinate, child-rearing wife. What lesbian or
gay man would want that?91
In sum, while the Supreme Court in Obergefell did not expressly
adopt a sex discrimination argument in striking down state marriage
bans,92 the demise of coverture and gender-based distinctions within
marriage provided a critical foundation for same-sex couples seeking the
freedom to marry. As explained further below, the existence of
Kirchberg and similar precedents made it impossible for supporters of
state marriage bans to defend such laws based on overt appeals to
gender-based differences or stereotypes, forcing them to fall back upon
a much narrower and ultimately unsuccessful appeal to the biological
differences involved in sexual procreation.
2. The Demise of Justifications Based on Viewing Gay People as
Immoral or Diseased
Just as the mandate of gender equality within marriage largely
foreclosed arguments based on overt sexism or gender stereotypes to
defend state marriage bans, so the growing legal and social acceptance
of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people made it increasingly difficult to
defend such bans on moral grounds. In 1973, the American Psychiatric
Association voted to remove “homosexuality” from its official
designation of mental disorders.93 In 1955, the American Law Institute
recommended that states repeal laws criminalizing private same-sex
intimacy,94 and Illinois became the first state to do so in 1961.95 Over the
91. Philip Galanes, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gloria Steinem on the Unending Fight for
Women’s Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/fashion
/ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-gloria-steinem-on-the-unending-fight-for-womens-rights.html? _r=0
[https://perma.cc/7VDN-BPSS].
92. Instead, the Court characterized the laws at issue as discriminating against same-sex
couples. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600–01 (2015).
93. Neel Burton, When Homosexuality Stopped Being a Mental Disorder, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201509/whenhomosexuality-stopped-being-mental-disorder [https://perma.cc/7HKE-D2UB].
94. Jennifer Naeger, Note, And Then There Were None: The Repeal of Sodomy Laws
After Lawrence v. Texas and Its Effect on the Custody and Visitation Rights of Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 397, 401 (2004) (“In 1955, the American Law Institute
(ALI) transformed the practice of non-enforcement into an official acknowledgement when it
decided that the Model Penal Code would not include sodomy laws.”).
95. Id.
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years, several state appellate courts struck down state same-sex sodomy
laws,96 and the U.S. Supreme Court finally declared such laws
unconstitutional in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas.97
Also beginning in the 1980s, many states began enacting laws
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment,
housing, and public accommodations.98 In 1996, the Seventh Circuit
issued the first federal appellate decision recognizing a federal cause of
action for homophobic harassment in public schools.99 The court held
that Jamie Nabozny, a Wisconsin student who had been viciously
harassed and bullied by other students because of his sexual orientation,
had stated a viable equal protection and Title IX claim.100 In the wake of
Nabozny, LGBT students brought many successful Title IX claims,
challenging homophobic peer harassment,101 and thousands of school
districts across the country adopted anti-discrimination policies to
protect LGBT students.102 The Department of Education recognized the
protections afforded to LGBT students in regulations and guidance,
expressly noting that Title IX “extends to claims of discrimination based

96. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1992). In Tennessee, for example, the
state supreme court refused to hear an appeal in a case granting summary judgment to a
group of individuals challenging the state’s sodomy act. See Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 250. In
1992, the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that sodomy laws were unconstitutional
under the state constitution. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
97. 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
98. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and
Religion: A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2448 n.146 (1997);
Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1625
(1996).
99. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Joseph G. Kosciw et
al., Gender Equity and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues in Education, in
HANDBOOK FOR ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY THROUGH EDUCATION 553, 555 (Susan S.
Klein et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing how Nabozny was “the first successful appellate
court decision involving school harassment of an LGBT student”).
100. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 449.
101. Kris Franklin, Empathy and Reasoning in Context: Thinking About Antigay Bullying,
23 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 61, 87 (2014).
102. See, e.g., John Wright, Over 900 Texas School Districts Quietly Ban Anti-LGBT
Bullying, TEX. OBSERVER (Sept. 28, 2015, 3:49 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/texasschool-districts-add-comprehensive-lgbt-protections/ [https://perma.cc/MV7J-4WLZ] (“And
since 2012, more than 900 Texas school districts have quietly—and in some cases perhaps
unknowingly—added references to sexual orientation and gender identity in their antiharassment policies.”); see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www
.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/nabozny-v-podlesny [https://perma.cc/6SQA-99WJ] (explaining
how the 1996 Nabozny decision “electrified the nation’s education community and led to an
explosion in legal advocacy for LGBTQ youth”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1161 (2017)

2017]

TRANSGENDER EQUALITY

1181

on . . . actual or perceived sexual orientation[,]” as well as to claims of
discrimination based on gender non-conformity.103
Similarly, in the family law arena, both state courts and state
legislatures increasingly rejected discrimination against parents in samesex relationships. As recently as the 1970s and early 1980s, many state
courts routinely denied custody and restricted visitation to openly
lesbian, gay, and bisexual parents.104 By the early 2000s, almost every
state had rejected such per se rules in favor of a nexus test requiring
state courts to view a parent’s sexual orientation as irrelevant unless
there was specific evidence, based on the facts of a particular case, that
the parent’s conduct was harming the child.105 Around the same time, a
growing number of state courts granted “second-parent adoptions” to
same-sex couples, providing those couples with a way for both parents to
have a legally recognized relationship with their children.106 In many of
these cases, the American Psychological Association and other groups
submitted amicus briefs summarizing the growing body of social science
literature showing that being lesbian, gay, or bisexual was not relevant to
a person’s overall psychological health or ability to be a good parent.107
Like the rise of gender equality in marriage, the growing medical,
legal, and social consensus that sexual orientation is not relevant to a
person’s ability to enter into committed relationships, contribute
positively to society, or be a good parent shut the door on legal
arguments that were previously used to justify discrimination against
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) people. If states could legitimately
seek to deter persons from being gay or from entering into same-sex
relationships, then seeking to establish an equal right of same-sex
103. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG6C-MRAA].
104. See Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the
Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 727 n.155 (2003); see also Christopher R.
Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 148 (2000).
105. See KAREN MOULDING, Raising Children and the New Family Law: The Irrelevance
of Sexual Orientation—Nexus and Specificity, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1.7,
at 21 (Karen Moulding & Roberta Achtenberg eds., 2016) (explaining that “[m]any courts
have employed an ‘adverse impact’ or ‘nexus’ test”); id. § 1.7, at 22 n.2 (providing a summary
of case law applying the nexus test when determining custody); Shannon Minter, Feature,
Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 18 GPSOLO, Oct.–Nov. 2001, at 36, 37–38.
106. Katrina Greiner, Foster Care and Adoption, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 503, 527–28
(2002) (surveying second-parent adoption cases in several states).
107. See, e.g., Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 21–30, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571,
14-574); see also Patricia M. Logue, The Facts of Life for Gay and Lesbian Parents Compelling
Equal Treatment Under the Law, 25 FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2002, at 43, 43–47 (2002).
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couples to marry would have been futile. In 1986, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick,108 a majority of the Court
resoundingly endorsed the notion that expressing moral disapproval of
homosexuality was a legitimate state interest.109 Seventeen years later,
however, the tables had turned. By 2003, when the Court decided
Lawrence v. Texas, an equally strong majority rejected the notion that
moral disapproval of same-sex intimacy or relationships could ever
constitute a legitimate state interest.110
To be sure, public opinion regarding the morality of same-sex
relationships remained profoundly divided throughout most of the two
decades from the Hawaii marriage decision in 1993 to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Obergefell in 2015.111 California’s Proposition 8, in
particular, unleashed a bitter firestorm of controversy and, in the short
term, dealt the marriage equality movement a serious blow. In the
longer view, however, simply by giving the issue of marriage by same-sex
couples so much visibility, Proposition 8 accelerated the process of
public understanding and galvanized LGBT people and allies across the
country to mount an unprecedented public education campaign.112
Proposition 8 also spurred Ted Olson, one of the icons of the
conservative movement, to come out in support of same-sex couples
seeking the freedom to marry and to file a case challenging the measure
in federal court.113 Increasingly, support for marriage equality came to be
seen as a bipartisan issue, uniting people across the political and
ideological spectrum.114
108. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
109. See id. at 196 (recognizing “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” as a legitimate state interest
and holding Georgia law criminalizing same-sex intimacy did not violate either the equal
protection or due process rights of a gay plaintiff).
110. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577–78 (2003) (rejecting moral disapproval of
gay people as a legitimate state interest).
111. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbianrights.aspx [https://perma.cc/2Z3L-3J8N].
112. Claude Summers, The Crucial Significance of Proposition 8, THE NEW C.R.
MOVEMENT (July 3, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/claude
_summers/the_crucial_significance_of_proposition_8 [http://perma.cc/58WM-YWG3].
113. See Susan Page, Ted Olson: ‘Point of No Return’ on Gay Marriage Passed, USA
TODAY (Oct. 27, 2014, 6:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/27
/capital-download-theodore-olson-supreme-court-gay-marriage/17952923/ [http://perma.cc
/HG4G-TSPE]. See generally DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEEMING THE
DREAM: PROPOSITION 8 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 15–21 (2014)
(recounting Olson’s decision to join the legal fight against Proposition 8 and his experience
with the case).
114. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kiley, 61% of Young Republicans Favor Same-Sex Marriage, PEW
RES. CTR. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/10/61-of-youngrepublicans-favor-same-sex-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/GP32-PUBC]; Donna Red Wing, The
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As a result of that remarkable progress, by 2015, the constitutional
trajectory of LGB people from “outlaws” to “outcasts” to fully equal,
respected, and participating members of society was complete.115 As the
Court held in Obergefell, persons in same-sex relationships must be
given “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.”116 While some resistance to
marriage equality continues,117 same-sex couples can now marry in every
state,118 and public opinion has overwhelmingly shifted in favor of
treating such couples equally in the eyes of the law.119
C.

The Shift to Biology-Based Arguments and Why It Failed

Because defenders of state marriage bans could not credibly appeal
to overt gender stereotypes or to the immorality or pathology of samesex relationships, they looked elsewhere to justify the exclusion of samesex couples from marriage. In Hawaii, after concluding that the state
marriage ban triggered heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the Hawaii Constitution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
remanded to give the State an opportunity to make its case.120 On
remand, the State sought to prove that Hawaii had a compelling state
interest in restricting marriage only to opposite-sex couples in order “to
promot[e] the optimal development of children.”121 At trial, however,
even the State’s own experts had to concede that lesbians and gay men
Bipartisan/Nonpartisan Push for Marriage Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2013, 1:04
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donna-red-wing/the-bipartisan-nonpartisan-push-formarriage-equality_b_2807196.html?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=Politics [https://perma.cc/WN2DDW9X].
115. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (describing the Court’s ruling in
Lawrence as having shifted gay people from the status of “outlaw[s]” to that of “outcast[s]”).
Despite that constitutional trajectory, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether federal
sex discrimination laws prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
and a majority of states still do not have laws that prohibit sexual orientation or gender
identity discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and other arenas.
See Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay-rights-leaders-push-for-federal-civil-rightsprotections.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P9C7-KZJ4].
116. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
117. Nico Lang, The Fight to Repeal Same-Sex Marriage Begins: Texas Hears Case to
Restrict Spousal Benefits to LGBT Couples, SALON (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.salon.com
/2017/03/07/the-fight-to-repeal-same-sex-marriage-begins-texas-hears-case-to-restrict-spousalbenefits-to-lgbt-couples/ [https://perma.cc/RHJ5-R4B3] (discussing recent attempts to “roll
back marriage equality”).
118. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
119. See id. at 2615 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that “[o]ver the last few years,
public opinion on marriage has shifted rapidly”); supra text accompanying notes 111–14.
120. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
121. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996),
aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (table decision), and rev’d, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (table
decision).
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were just as capable of being good parents as heterosexual persons.122 As
the trial court held, “[t]he sexual orientation of parents is not in and of
itself an indicator of the overall adjustment and development of
children.”123 Moreover, the court noted that “[g]ay and lesbian parents
and same-sex couples can be as fit and loving parents, as non-gay men
and women and different-sex couples.”124
After this case, state officials and others defending state marriage
bans continued to focus on justifications related to children, but
increasingly turned to arguments based on the supposedly causal
relationship between biological procreation and marriage. Both in court
and in the arena of public opinion, those who continued to support state
marriage bans argued that permitting same-sex couples to marry would
undermine the purportedly central connection between marriage and
biological procreation.125 They argued that the purpose of marriage is to
channel biological procreation and encourage couples that have children
together to enter into a stable family relationship.126 In effect, they
reverse engineered a vision of marriage that focused on the one
characteristic that distinguishes same-sex couples from many oppositesex couples: their inability to procreate. In the words of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “[t]he ‘marriage is procreation’
argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex
and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that difference into the
essence of legal marriage.”127
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id. at *17.
124. Id.
125. See William Saletan, Biological Baloney: The Glaring Contradiction at the Heart of the
Anti-Gay Marriage Argument, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/frame_game/2015/04/the_glaring_contradiction_at_the_heart_of_the
_anti_gay_marriage_argument.html [https://perma.cc/P7SC-TFD6].
126. Mark Sherman, Meet the Five Lawyers Who Will Be Fighting for Same Sex Marriage
in the Supreme Court This Week, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/meet-the-five-lawyers-who-will-be-fighting-for-same-sex-marriage-inthe-supreme-court-this-week-2015-4 [http://perma.cc/P7EB-XKBM] (noting the Tennessee
Attorney General’s office defended that state’s marriage ban by contending that “[t]he
legitimate interest of the state is to ensure that when children are born, particularly children
who are born and the pregnancy is accidental, that they will be born into stable family units,
i.e., marriage”); see also DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 201–12 (2007).
After serving as one of the primary public spokespersons for same-sex marriage bans and
providing expert testimony supporting California’s Proposition 8 in the federal case that held
Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional, Blankenhorn changed his position, explaining that he no
longer believed that excluding same-sex couples from marriage could be legally justified.
David Blankenhorn, Opinion, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed
.html [https://perma.cc/8XRF-AEQX].
127. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
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The tactical benefits of this argument were clear. By contending
that marriage is defined by its link to heterosexual procreation,
defenders of state marriage bans could argue that the restriction of
marriage to opposite-sex couples simply reflects a biological reality, not
animus or bias toward same-sex couples. Because same-sex couples
cannot biologically procreate, they reasoned, those couples simply fall
outside the purpose of marriage and may be permissibly excluded from
it.128
Ultimately, however, this attempt to rely on biology did not
succeed. While some courts initially accepted arguments based on
procreation as a sufficient justification for state marriage bans,129 over
time, courts increasingly rejected them as fatally under-inclusive both of
the purposes of marriage (which include protecting couples who do not
have children) and the range of families (including same-sex parents)
who would benefit from the stability and protections of marriage.130 In
Obergefell, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion,
holding that appeals to biology could not justify the exclusion of samesex couples from the freedom to marry.131 Despite the dissent’s objection
that “every state” at some point “defined marriage in the traditional,
biologically rooted way[,]”132 the Court held that excluding same-sex
couples from marriage undermined, rather than furthered, the state’s
interest in responsible procreation.133
Today, less than two years after Obergefell, advocates for
transgender equality must confront biology-based arguments and tactics
remarkably similar to those previously used to oppose marriage equality
for same-sex couples. In fact, the situation facing transgender advocates
now is strikingly similar to that facing marriage equality advocates in the
decade or so before Obergefell was decided. Those challenging marriage
bans failed for many years before the victory in Hawaii signaled a
turning of the tide. Similarly, after decades of failure in the courts,
128. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents (No. 14-571), supra note 68, at 46 (describing
Michigan’s marriage laws as “based on biological complementarity, not sexual orientation”);
Tierney Sneed, Don’t Listen to Same-Sex Marriage Foes: It Was Always About Hating on the
Gays, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jun. 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc
/same-sex-marriage-scotus-animus-preview [http://perma.cc/U69V-RUVX].
129. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 586 (Md. 2007), opinion extended after
remand, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2008 WL 3999843 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 2008); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006)
(en banc).
130. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472 (9th Cir. 2015); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d
1193, 1219 (10th Cir. 2014).
131. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
132. Id. at 2614 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2600–01 (majority opinion).
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transgender advocates today are making remarkably rapid progress. The
backlash to that progress is intense, just as it was for same-sex couples in
the aftermath of Baehr v. Lewin, and the stakes, this time for
transgender people, are equally high.134
II. THE REVIVAL OF BIOLOGY-BASED ARGUMENTS IN THE DEBATE
OVER TRANSGENDER EQUALITY
The movement to achieve transgender equality has, in many ways,
paralleled the legal battle for marriage equality. After years of judicial
losses, the last decade has brought about a sea change in the courts, with
more and more decisions protecting the right of transgender persons to
equal treatment under the law. At the same time, medical science has
recognized that being transgender is a normal variation of human
experience and that, with the proper support, transgender people can be
healthy, productive members of society.135 In response to these changes,
those who oppose transgender equality have found themselves in a
dilemma similar to that previously confronting those who opposed
marriage equality for same-sex couples—namely, wishing to defend laws
and policies that treat transgender persons differently than others, but
unable to credibly do so based either on overt appeals to gender
stereotypes or to arguments based on the immorality or pathology of
transgender identity.
This Part examines the resurgence of biology-based arguments in
this new context, particularly with respect to laws and policies that seek
to exclude transgender people from common restrooms. It predicts that,
similar to the fate of such arguments in cases challenging state marriage
bans, courts will ultimately reject such arguments as circular and
insufficient to justify the significant harms that they impose upon
transgender people.

134. Janet Mock, Janet Mock: Young People Get Trans Rights. It’s Adults Who Don’t, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/opinion/janet-mock-youngpeople-get-trans-rights-its-adults-who-dont.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5HUU-CCWH];
Scott Skinner-Thompson, The Supreme Court Should Decide the Gavin Grimm Case Now,
SLATE (Feb. 27, 2017, 3:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/02/27/scotus_should
_decide_the_gavin_grimm_transgender_case_now.html [https://perma.cc/Q7LS-SYSM].
135. See Brief of Amici Curiae the World Prof’l Ass’n for Transgender Health, Pediatric
Endocrine Soc’y, et al. in Support of Appellant at 15–17, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2056), vacated and remanded in part, __ S.
Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
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A. “The Transgender Tipping Point”136
Just as the push for marriage equality gained unprecedented
traction in the 1990s and escalated rapidly in the years before Obergefell,
the movement to gain equality for transgender people has hit a critical
tipping point in the last decade. In the 1970s and 1980s, most
transgender litigants seeking protection in the courts met with failure,
rejection, and in some instances, even ridicule.137 In the past few
decades, however, signs of positive change have emerged. In 1993,
Minnesota became the first state to enact a law expressly prohibiting
discrimination against transgender people in employment, housing, and
public accommodations.138 Throughout the 1990s, dozens of localities
enacted similar local antidiscrimination laws.139 In 1998, California added
express protections for transgender people to its hate crimes law and
shortly thereafter, adopted similar antidiscrimination protections for
transgender students.140 Today, eighteen states expressly prohibit
discrimination based on gender identity in their state laws.141
More recently, both the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and courts across the country have begun
reversing older precedents that excluded transgender people from
protection and imposing liability for discrimination against transgender
people under state and federal sex discrimination laws. In Macy v.
Holder,142 the EEOC held that Title VII protects federal transgender
workers against discrimination, regardless of whether that
discrimination is “motivated by hostility, by a desire to protect people of

136. In June 2014, the cover of TIME read “The Transgender Tipping Point” and featured
actress Laverne Cox, the first transgender person to appear on TIME’s cover. Nicholas Snow,
‘Time’ Magazine’s ‘Transgender Tipping Point’ Cover Girl, HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2015,
2:30
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nicholas-snow/laverne-cox-time-magazine_b
_7238884.html [https://perma.cc/Y8V8-RJ8C]. The magazine cover identified the transgender
movement as “America’s next civil rights frontier[.]” Katy Steinmetz, The Transgender
Tipping Point, TIME, June 9, 2014, at cover, 38–46.
137. See Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to
Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 37, 39 (2000).
138. Act of Apr. 2, 1993, ch. 22, 1993 Minn. Laws 121, 121–22 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of MINN. STAT. § 363); Currah & Minter, supra note 137, at 46.
139. See Currah & Minter, supra note 137, at 45; Non-Discrimination Laws That Include
Gender Identity and Expression, TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST., http://www
.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/YGP4-ZXAE] (last
updated Feb. 1, 2012) (providing a comprehensive list of local and state laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of gender identity).
140. Currah & Minter, supra note 137, at 46.
141. LGBT Americans Aren’t Fully Protected from Discrimination in 32 States, FREEDOM
FOR ALL AMS., http://www.freedomforallamericans.org/states/ [http://perma.cc/3Z8T-EJN3].
142. No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012)
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a certain gender, by assumptions that disadvantage men, by gender
stereotypes, or by the desire to accommodate other people’s prejudices
or discomfort.”143 In Lusardi v. McHugh,144 the EEOC clarified that the
requirement of nondiscrimination includes equal access to shared
restrooms and other gender-segregated facilities.145 Also in recent years,
the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have all
agreed that federal sex discrimination laws must be construed broadly to
protect transgender people against discrimination,146 and the Eighth
Circuit has expressly rejected a claim that being required to share a
communal restroom with a transgender person constitutes sexual
harassment or an invasion of privacy.147 In the last eight years, the U.S.
Department of Justice and other agencies across the federal government
have adopted similar positions, affirming that transgender persons are
fully protected by sex discrimination laws and that policies excluding
them from using the same restrooms used by others, consistent with
their gender identities violate those laws.148
At the same time, just as medical science rejected older models of
gay identity as pathological, medical experts increasingly have
recognized that being transgender is not a disorder. In the most recent
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”), the diagnosis given to
facilitate medical treatment for transgender people was changed from
“gender identity disorder” to “gender dysphoria,” to better reflect that
simply being transgender is not in itself a mental disorder.149 More
143. Id. at *10.
144. No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (EEOC Apr. 1, 2015).
145. Id. at *10.
146. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded in part, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755; Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004);
Rosa v. Parks W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000); see also G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that the U.S. Department of Education’s
guidance recognizing protections for transgender students was entitled Auer deference),
vacated and remanded in part, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
147. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
school’s policy of permitting transgender women to use women’s restroom did not create a
hostile work environment for other female teachers).
148. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Departments of Education and
Justice Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools Ensure the Civil Rights of Transgender
Students (May 13, 2016), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departments-educationand-justice-release-joint-guidance-help-schools-ensure-civil-rights-transgender-students [http://
perma.cc/T5CW-W434].
149. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the term gender dysphoria “is more
descriptive than the previous DSM-IV term gender identity disorder and focuses on dysphoria
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broadly, medical and mental health organizations have issued numerous
policy statements condemning discrimination against transgender people
and calling for their full inclusion, on equal terms, in all aspects of
society.150 Transgender people have gained tremendous visibility in
popular culture as well, including positive depictions of transgender
characters in television shows and of transgender public figures in
mainstream media publications.151
B.

Backlash: Mounting Opposition to Transgender Equality

In response to this unprecedented progress, state officials and
conservative groups have launched an equally unprecedented
counterattack. Across the country, those who oppose transgender
equality are bringing lawsuits challenging nondiscrimination policies,152
sponsoring legislation to restrict the rights of transgender people,153
boycotting businesses that have pledged not to discriminate against
transgender people,154 and mounting public campaigns depicting the

as the clinical problem, not identity per se”); see also Wynne Parry, Gender Dysphoria: DSM5 Reflects Shift in Perspective on Gender Identity, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2013, 3:00 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gender-dysphoria-dsm-5_n_3385287.html [http://
perma.cc/Z2DY-4TL3] (explaining that this change in terminology signaled that the mental
health profession does not view being transgender as a disorder but rather seeks merely to
alleviate the dysphoria experienced by many transgender people). Like the American
Psychiatric Association, all the remaining major professional associations of medical and
mental health providers recognize that having a gender identity that differ from a person’s
birth-assigned sex is not a disorder, but instead a medical condition that requires appropriate
treatment that affirms a transgender person’s gender identity. See PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN HEALTH CARE,
LAMBDA LEGAL 1–6 (2016), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications
/downloads/ll_trans_professional_statements.rtf_.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH4M-LD6J].
150. See, e.g., Transgender, Gender Identity & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination,
AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 2008), http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx [http://
perma.cc/YR5K-K57E].
151. See Shannon Price Minter, Supporting Transgender Children: New Legal, Social, and
Medical Approaches, 59 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 422, 423–25 (2012).
152. See, e.g., Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2016 WL 7638311, at
*22 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2016) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing a regulation prohibiting
discrimination against transgender people); Ian Lovett & Louise Radnofsky, U.S. Sued over
New Transgender Health-Care Protections, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2016, 1:11 PM), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sued-over-new-transgender-health-care-regulation-1471995720 [http://
perma.cc/P2WF-Q5BD].
153. Alia E. Dastagir, The Imaginary Predator in America’s Transgender Bathroom War,
USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2016, 8:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/04
/28/transgender-bathroom-bills-discrimination/32594395/ [http://perma.cc/K4UL-KKSA].
154. Id. For example, the American Family Association, a conservative activist group, has
garnered nearly 1 million signatures from individuals pledging to boycott Target in response
to their transgender-inclusive bathroom policy. Id.
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transgender equality movement as misguided and dangerous.155 For the
most part, however, these efforts seek to avoid attacking transgender
people directly.156 Instead, as happened in the marriage equality battles,
those who oppose the rapid progress of transgender equality are once
again invoking biology-based arguments—this time, in an attempt to
justify the exclusion of transgender people from restrooms.
C.

The Focus on Restrooms

As a strategic matter, it is no accident that opponents of
transgender equality have focused so intently on restrooms—one of the
few places where gender segregation is still permitted. By sponsoring
legislation and bringing cases that focus on restrooms, opponents have
forced transgender advocates onto vulnerable terrain, compelling them
to defend antidiscrimination policies for transgender people in a context
that triggers many people’s deep-seated anxieties and fears about
sexuality and gender.157 In addition, being forced to devote time and
resources to defending equal treatment in restrooms diverts transgender
advocates from other goals. Certainly, being able to use restrooms based
on one’s gender identity is important and often is a prerequisite to other
more important rights, such as being able to attend school or work
without fear of discrimination. For example, a transgender student who

155. See Riham Feshir, Target Transgender Bathroom Policy Sparks Opposition
Campaign, MPR NEWS (May 16, 2016), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/05/16/targettransgender-bathroom-policy-sparks-opposition-campaign [http://perma.cc/MAM4-CJZB]
(stating that Target’s inclusive restroom policy takes “the wrong side in a massive cultural
assault on women and girls”).
156. See, e.g., Dastagir, supra note 153 (describing the fear that “[m]ale perverts and
pedophiles disguised as women (faux transgender people) will troll women’s bathrooms and
sexually assault our wives and daughters”); Rachel Tuchman, Not in the Name of My
“Protection”, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2016, 12:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/rachel-tuchman/not-in-the-name-of-my-pro_b_9593714.html [https://perma.cc/RH9H-GKKN]
(discussing the North Carolina campaign aimed at “keep[ing] . . . children safe”). In some
instances, however, groups have promulgated ads and other materials that directly stigmatize
and attack transgender people as immoral, dangerous, and depraved. See, e.g., Lucas Grindley
& Dawn Ennis, In This New Ted Cruz Ad, Trans People Are Predators, ADVOC. (Apr. 22,
2016, 10:31 AM), http://www.advocate.com/election/2016/4/22/everything-you-need-knowabout-ted-cruzs-transphobic-attack-ad-video [http://perma.cc/MG4F-9Z4T].
157. See German Lopez, Texas’s Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bill, Explained, VOX (Jan. 5,
2017, 4:07 PM), http://www.vox.com/identities/2017/1/5/14173882/texas-transgenderbathroom-law-lgbtq [https://perma.cc/3U27-G3GV] (“While the issue is now being used
primarily against trans people, historically bathroom fears have been regularly deployed
against civil rights causes [because] . . . . [b]athrooms are places where really private things
happen, and that makes people feel vulnerable in all sorts of ways.”); Maria L. La Ganga,
From Jim Crow to Transgender Ban: the Bathroom as Battleground for Civil Rights,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30
/transgender-ban-bathrooms-north-carolina-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/5Z4N-W6S9].
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is constantly “outed” as such by being forced to use a separate bathroom
is likely to be targeted for harassment, and, at a minimum, will be
negatively affected by the constant stigma of being treated differently
than other students.158
Nonetheless, if transgender advocates were able to choose their
own priorities, equal treatment in restrooms, in and of itself, would
likely fall lower on the scale than ensuring that transgender people are
able to work, attend school, be free from hate violence, have access to
homeless shelters and medically necessary care, secure accurate stateissued identification, raise children, obtain asylum, and be protected
from violence and abuse in prisons, jails, and detention facilities. Rather
than focusing on any of these other equality issues, where seeking to
justify discrimination would be more challenging, the opponents of
transgender equality have made a strategic choice to make restrooms the
centerpiece of their opposition. In so doing, they have identified the one
context where, on its face, biological differences between men and
women are likely to seem most important, just as focusing on the role of
procreation in marriage highlighted the one aspect of marriage where
biological differences were likely to be seen as highly relevant.159
For opponents of transgender equality, this narrow focus on
restrooms serves many of the same strategic purposes as the narrow
focus on procreation served for the opponents of marriage equality.
First, it allows them to tell a story about the origins and purposes of sexseparated restrooms that resonates with popular understandings about
“biological sex” and the importance of anatomical differences between
men and women.160 Second, by highlighting those biological differences,
it provides a ready way to deny that policies barring transgender people
from shared restrooms are based on animus or bias and to depict such
policies as a benign reflection of natural reality. Finally, it allows those
defending such exclusionary policies to exploit fears about the
vulnerability of women and children—themes with a long history among
those opposing both gender equality and equality for LGBT people.161

158. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for the World Prof’l Ass’n for Transgender Health,
Pediatric Endocrine Soc’y et al. in Support of Appellant, supra note 135, at 29–30.
159. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
160. For example, in North Carolina proponents of H.B. 2 have taken particular care to
promote the legislation as a “common-sense” measure. See ‘Myths vs Facts’ About House Bill
2 Released by NC Gov. Pat McCrory’s Office, FOX 8 (Mar. 29, 2016, 12:44 PM) http://myfox8
.com/2016/03/29/myths-vs-facts-about-house-bill-2-released-by-nc-gov-pat-mccrorys-office/
[http://perma.cc/H2ZC-WAHC].
161. For an overview of how such arguments were used to support laws that barred
women from certain professions and to justify other types of discrimination against women,
see Teresa Godwin Phelps, Gendered Space and the Reasonableness Standard in Sexual
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D. Appeals to the “Traditional” Definition of Sex
Just as marriage equality opponents sought to defend a
“traditional” view of marriage, defined by biological procreation, so
transgender equality opponents are now seeking to defend a
“traditional” view of sex, defined by the “physiological differences
between men and women, rather than differences in gender identity.”162
In the past, state officials and conservative groups argued that courts
must defer to the “traditional” procreation-based definition of
marriage.163 Today, cases challenging the equal treatment of transgender
people in restrooms similarly rest almost exclusively on appeals to the
so-called “traditional” view of the term “sex” in federal
nondiscrimination laws.164
In the long run, this appeal to tradition is unlikely to succeed, just as
it ultimately proved unsuccessful in halting the nationwide recognition
of marriage equality for same-sex couples. In the marriage cases, courts
ultimately recognized that the so-called “traditional” view of marriage
simply could not be reconciled with contemporary marriage and family
law, which had long since recognized that marriage serves many
purposes other than procreation and extended equal parental
protections to adopted children and those born through assisted
reproduction.165
Similarly, as many courts have already recognized, sex
discrimination jurisprudence has long since abandoned the “traditional”
definition of sex as defined only or even primarily by a person’s
anatomical or biological sex. In older cases, courts often adopted such a
narrow, biological view of the term sex. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.,166 for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected a sex discrimination
claim by a transgender plaintiff, holding that Title VII prohibits only
Harassment Cases, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 265, 279–80 (1998); see also In
re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 542 (1869), aff’d sub nom. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)
(upholding an Illinios law barring women from being lawyers based upon their purported
fragility and need for protection). For an examination of the outsized role such arguments
have played in efforts to oppose equality for LGBT people, including in marriage, see
Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative That Gays and Lesbians
Are Harmful to Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125, 128 (2013).
162. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 640–41 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 125–33.
164. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 736 (4th Cir.
2016) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“The text of Title IX and its regulations allowing for
separation of each facility ‘on the basis of sex’ employs the term ‘sex’ as was generally
understood at the time of enactment.”), vacated and remanded in part, __ S. Ct. __ (2017)
(mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
165. Joslin, supra note 68, at 1471.
166. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
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discrimination “against women because they are women and against
men because they are men.”167 But in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,168
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that narrow view and held that Title
VII also prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s nonconformity
to gender stereotypes.169 In the wake of Price Waterhouse, courts have
overwhelmingly recognized that the term “sex” in federal
antidiscrimination law must be construed broadly and cannot be reduced
to a person’s biological or anatomical sex.170 As a result, they have held
that older cases excluding transgender persons from protection under
sex discrimination statutes are no longer good law.171 In Grimm, the
Supreme Court would have faced this issue directly once again, in the
first case since Price Waterhouse to pose the question of whether the
term “sex” in federal antidiscrimination laws can be reduced to a narrow
biological definition.172 Especially in light of the considerable lower
court precedent now resting on the Court’s prior rejection of such a
narrow view,173 it seems unlikely that the Court would have turned back
the clock on such a foundational principle of contemporary sex
discrimination law.

167. Id. at 1085; id. at 1086 (holding that the term “sex” “should be given a narrow,
traditional interpretation, which would also exclude transsexuals”).
168. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
169. Id. at 255.
170. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Davis, J., concurring) (citing cases), vacated and remanded in part, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.),
2017 WL 855755. As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, “the weight of circuit authority”
rejects such a narrow biological interpretation of the term “sex” and holds that discrimination
against transgender individuals constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. But see id. at
736–37 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the term “sex” in Title IX means “the
physiological distinctions between males and females”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502
F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that “discrimination against a transsexual based on
the person’s status as a transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII”);
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 676 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Etsitty, 502
F.3d at 1221).
171. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e find that the
district court erred in relying on a series of pre-Price Waterhouse cases from other federal
appellate courts holding that transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to Title VII
protection.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he initial judicial
approach taken in [such] cases . . . has been overruled by the language and logic of Price
Waterhouse.”).
172. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.), 2016
WL 4565643, at *1.
173. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith, 378 F.3d at
572; Fabian v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016).
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Claims That Exclusionary Policies Reflect Biology, Not Bias

As the marriage cases show, biological arguments provide a way to
gloss over the complex histories that have shaped institutions such as
marriage and gender-segregated restrooms.174 Acknowledging those
histories would require equality opponents to concede that those
institutions did not simply fall from the skies, but rather have been
shaped by changing cultural and legal norms. In turn, such a concession
would require them to defend their normative vision of how those
institutions should be structured—and in particular, to explain why the
exclusion of same-sex couples or transgender people is justified. Instead,
equality opponents invoke biology in order to bypass the need for such
explanations. Rather than offering substantive justifications for limiting
marriage only to male-female couples or for requiring transgender
people to use separate restrooms, they tell a timeless “origin story”
that—no matter how dubious as a historical matter—resonates with
deeply held popular beliefs about purportedly “natural” differences
between men and women.175
1. Biological Justifications for State Marriage Bans
For supporters of state marriage bans, that origin story was simple:
marriage exists because “sex between men and women makes babies.”176
According to this view, laws barring same-sex couples from marriage
merely reflected the biological reality that men impregnate women
through sexual intercourse. As a New Jersey Superior Court judge
explained, “[p]rocreative heterosexual intercourse is and has been
historically through all times and cultures an important feature of [the]
privileged status [of marriage], and that characteristic is a fundamental
originating reason why the [s]tate privileges marriage.”177

174. See text accompanying infra notes 194–95.
175. See text accompanying infra notes 190–91.
176. Maggie Gallagher, What Marriage Is For, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4–Aug. 11, 2003,
at 22.
177. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo, J.,
concurring), aff’d as modified, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 430 (Cal. 2008) (describing and rejecting the argument that “because only a man and
a woman can produce children biologically with one another, the constitutional right to marry
necessarily is limited to opposite-sex couples”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(“The partners in a marriage are expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations, with
children the probable result and paternity presumed.”). Before Obergefell, some state courts
also invoked this view of marriage to invalidate the marriages of transgender people. See, e.g.,
In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 121 (Kan. 2002) (“A traditional marriage is the legal
relationship between a biological man and a biological woman for the discharge to each other
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In these and other cases, those defending marriage bans argued that
laws barring same-sex couples from marriage were not based on bias or
animus against gay people, but rather simply reflected the biological
realities of procreation.178 In the words of one state supreme court
justice, “[t]he ancient definition of marriage as the union of one man and
one woman has its basis in biology, not bigotry.”179 In briefs as well as
public arguments, defenders of “traditional” marriage argued that their
goal was simply to preserve the defining link between marriage and
biological procreation, not to discriminate against same-sex couples
whose exclusion from the freedom to marry was purportedly merely
incidental to that goal.180
At least initially, some courts agreed. For example, in Hernandez v.
Robles,181 the New York Court of Appeals held that same-sex couples
could be excluded from marriage based on their inability to procreate
through sexual intercourse.182 The court explained,
Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the
birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the
advances of science, it remains true that the vast majority of
children are born as a result of a sexual relationship between a
man and a woman, and the Legislature could find that this will
continue to be true.183
Ultimately, however, most courts—including the U.S. Supreme
Court—rejected this ahistorical account of marriage, recognizing that it
bore little if any resemblance to the rich, varied, and ongoing evolution
and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose relationship is founded on
the distinction of sex.”).
178. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents (No. 14-571), supra note 68, at 43–46; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter, supra note 68, at 9–10.
179. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 516 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting).
180. Brief for the Respondents (No. 14-571), supra note 68, at 42–43 (“Michigan’s
marriage laws are focused on the unique capacity of opposite-sex couples to procreate, not
animus toward same-sex couples.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch”
Otter, supra note 68, at 9–10; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). Of
course, some defenders of state marriage bans openly conceded that the true purpose of such
bans was to favor opposite-sex couples. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Straight Is Better: Why
Law and Society May Justly Prefer Heterosexuality, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 359, 409–11
(2011).
181. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. State supreme courts in Washington and Maryland agreed, issuing similar opinions
accepting the view that marriage is defined by its link to heterosexual procreation. Andersen
v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 621 (Md.
2007), opinion extended after remand, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2008 WL 3999843 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2008).
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of marriage as a legal and social institution over time and across
different cultures.184 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court addressed this
issue directly, noting that marriage “has not stood in isolation from
developments in law and society,” but “has evolved over time.”185 The
Court especially emphasized how profoundly marriage has altered in
response to the changing “role and status of women[,]” including the
abolition of coverture.186 The Court further noted that “[t]hese and other
developments . . . worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting
aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential.”187 Such a view is
far removed from attempts to portray marriage as a timeless, crosscultural vehicle for channeling biological procreation.
2. Biological Justifications for Laws and Policies Barring
Transgender Persons from Shared Restrooms
Today, transgender equality opponents seek to rely on a similarly
timeless and universal tale about the supposedly biological origins of
gender-separated restrooms. In this account, gender-separated
bathrooms are simply the natural reflection of the physiological
differences between men and women.188 Because men and women have
different bodies, this story goes, they require different restrooms. In
Grimm, for example, the Fourth Circuit upheld the guidance issued by
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice requiring
schools to permit transgender students to use the same restrooms that
corresponds with their gender identities.189 A dissenting judge, however,
disagreed, citing the supposedly universal history of gender-segregated
184. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883–84 (Iowa 2009) (noting the multiple purposes
of marriage under contemporary marriage laws); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 427–28
(Cal. 2008) (recognizing that marriage serves multiple purposes and must be understood in
light of changing social and legal views of gay people), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5 (2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 481–82 (Conn. 2008) (explaining that courts must take into account social changes
including evolution in the “conventional view” of marriage).
185. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, Why Do We Have Men’s and Women’s Bathrooms Anyway?,
TIME (May 16, 2016), http://time.com/4337761/history-sex-segregated-bathrooms/ [http://
perma.cc/AQ3C-NQKL] (describing the widely held belief that the existence of separate
restrooms for men and women reflects “basic biological differences”); Frank Turek,
Commentary, Six Reasons North Carolina Got It Right, ONENEWSNOW (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.onenewsnow.com/perspectives/guest-commentary/2016/03/30/six-reasons-northcarolina-got-it-right [http://perma.cc/7VTL-KHS7] (“The reason we’ve always had separate
bathrooms is because of biological sexual differences, not because of feelings or ‘gender
identity.’ ”).
189. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded in part, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
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restrooms: “Across societies and throughout history, it has been
commonplace and universally accepted to separate public restrooms,
locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of biological sex in order
to address privacy and safety concerns arising from the biological
differences between males and females.”190
In fact, as scholars from a variety of disciplines have documented,
this ahistorical narrative ignores the evolving legal and cultural norms
that have shaped the modern conception of public restrooms.191 Genderseparated restrooms have not been a universal feature either of all other
cultures across time or of our own culture. In this country,
Massachusetts passed the first law mandating gender-segregated
restrooms in 1887.192 By 1920, forty-three other states had followed
suit.193 Along with related laws providing separate reading rooms for
women in libraries and separate cars for women in public trains, these
laws were based on now discredited beliefs about women’s inherent
fragility, modesty, and need for shelter from men.194 Like regulations
limiting the hours that women could work and the types of jobs they
could hold, laws mandating separate restrooms reflected widespread
cultural anxieties about the entry of women into public workplaces.195
Far from simply reflecting biological differences between the sexes,
these laws were “deeply bound up with early nineteenth century moral
ideology concerning the appropriate role and place for women in
society.”196
Recognizing that gender stereotypes have played a powerful role in
the history of gender-segregated restrooms does not necessarily compel
their abolition any more than recognizing the history of gender
inequality in marriage compelled the elimination of marriage as legal
190. Id. at 734 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Kathryn H. Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Privileging in Perspective:
Gender and Family Issues in Toilet Design, in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND
GENDER 48, 48–55 (Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner eds., 2009); Olga Gershenson, The
Restroom Revolution: Unique Toilets and Campus Politics, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS
AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 191, 199–202 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Norén eds., 2010).
As sociologist Erving Goffman long ago noted, “[t]he functioning of sex-differentiated
organs is involved, but there is nothing in this functioning that biologically recommends
segregation; that arrangement is totally a cultural matter.” Erving Goffman, The Arrangement
Between the Sexes, 4 THEORY & SOC’Y 301, 316 (1977).
192. Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Mass Acts, 668, 669; Terry S. Kogan, SexSeparation in the Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
1, 15 (2007).
193. Kogan, supra note 192, at 39. See, e.g., Act of May 25, 1887, ch. 462, § 13, 1887 N.Y.
Laws 575, 577; Act of June 3, 1893, No. 244, § 10, 1893 Pa. Laws, 276, 278.
194. Kogan, supra note 192, at 30–32.
195. Id. at 50.
196. Id. at 55.
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institution. Rather, just as eliminating gender inequality in marriage has
strengthened marriage as an institution, eliminating discrimination
against transgender people is compatible with the continued existence of
gender-segregated restrooms. By acknowledging that institutions such as
marriage and gender-segregated restrooms are shaped by evolving legal
and cultural norms, courts can fulfill their constitutional role of ensuring
that when the government restricts equal access to important social
institutions, it has sufficient justifications for doing so.197 Where no
sufficient justifications exist, such restrictions violate the requirement of
equal protection and must be struck down.198 In contrast, claims that
such institutions merely reflect biological realities improperly insulate
such restrictions from meaningful review. Such claims mask the social
and legal choices that privilege certain groups and harm others by falsely
portraying those choices as neutral biological imperatives.
Similar to the argument that marriage bans did not discriminate
against gay couples but merely reflected the biological reality of
procreation, those seeking to defend policies that require individuals to
use restrooms corresponding to their “biological sex” contend that such
policies do not intentionally discriminate against transgender people, but
merely reflect the biological reality of sexual difference.199 According to
this view, restricting access to restrooms based on biological differences
between men and women does not amount to discrimination. Although
such policies would exclude many transgender people from using
197. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). The Court explained in
Obergefell,
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the
judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. . . . it requires courts to exercise reasoned
judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must
accord them its respect. . . . History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but
do not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history and learns from it
without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (holding that the
Commonwealth of Virginia lacked a sufficient justification for excluding women from the
Virginia Military Institute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (holding that Colorado
lacked a sufficient justification for excluding gay persons from “protections against exclusion
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that Texas lacked a
sufficient justification for excluding undocumented children from public schools); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that states lack a sufficient justification for
excluding black children from the same public schools attended by white students).
199. See, e.g., ‘Myths vs Facts’ About House Bill 2 Released by NC Gov. Pat McCrory’s
Office, supra note 160 (noting efforts by proponents of H.B. 2 to describe the legislation as a
“common sense” measure).
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restrooms consistent with their identities as men or women, those who
support them claim that they are not intended to discriminate, and that
their negative impact on transgender people is merely an incidental
effect of a neutral biology-based rule.200
In short, by casting gender-segregated restrooms as a mere
reflection of biological truths, opponents of transgender equality seek to
insulate certain laws and policies—such as those basing restroom access
on a person’s “biological sex”—from any meaningful scrutiny. But just
as the Supreme Court ultimately recognized that appeals to biology
could not justify laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage, it is
likely that most courts will recognize that such appeals also cannot
justify discrimination against transgender people in restrooms. Already,
a growing number of courts have recognized that the question of how to
incorporate transgender people within our culturally dominant system of
gender-segregated restrooms is a real question that deserves serious
consideration.201 And because gender-segregated restrooms are not
simple reflections of biology, it cannot be answered simply by pointing
to the physiological differences between men and woman.
F.

Claims That Exclusionary Policies Protect Women

Proponents of biology-based arguments about marriage and
gender-segregated restrooms also frequently argue that maintaining a
discriminatory exclusion is justified by the gender-based vulnerability of
women and girls. For example, defenders of state marriage bans often
portrayed women as uniquely vulnerable based on their biological
ability to become pregnant and give birth.202 Because of that biological
vulnerability, they argued, women require protection from being
200. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist.’s Response in Opposition to
Intervenor Third-Party Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13, Bd. of Educ. of the
Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-cv-00524-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 6, 2016), ECF No. 61; Defendant Patrick L. McCrory’s Initial Response in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10–11, Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d
615 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
201. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721–22 (4th
Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755; Bd. of Educ.
of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-cv-00524, 2016 WL 5372349,
at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., No. 2:16-cv-00943-PP, 2016 WL 5376330, at *9–15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2016).
202. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for 100 Scholars of Marriage in Support of
Respondents at 22, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571,
14-574) (arguing that the primary purpose of marriage is to ensure that men do not abandon
their children and leave women to raise them alone); Brief of Amicus Curiae Idaho Governor
C.L. “Butch” Otter, supra note 68, at 13–14 (arguing that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples is needed to protect women who become pregnant through heterosexual intercourse
and to “encourage the father to stick around”).
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harmed by men who—absent the pressure to marry—would not take
responsibility for the children they father.203 In its most robust and farfetched formulation, this argument claimed that permitting same-sex
couples to marry would deter men from taking responsibility for
children and fatally undermine the link between marriage and
procreation, effectively destroying marriage as a viable institution.204 In
Obergefell, for instance, those defending state marriage bans contended
that “licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between natural
procreation and marriage.”205
Similarly, defenders of policies that exclude transgender people
from restrooms often portray women and girls as uniquely biologically
vulnerable to sexual predation and harassment, while portraying men as
inherently more violent and dangerous.206 Proponents of this view claim
that permitting transgender people to use restrooms based on their
gender identity will render women and girls more vulnerable to
sexualized, gender-based violence.207 Generally, they do not contend
that transgender women pose a threat to others. Rather, the argument is
that permitting transgender people to use shared restrooms is such a
radical alteration of current biology-based norms that it effectively
destroys the very institution of gender-segregated restrooms, opening
the door to men masquerading as women (or falsely claiming a

203. Brief for 100 Scholars of Marriage as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 202, at 21 (suggesting that marriages of opposite-sex couples are directly responsible for
“lower rates of fatherlessness”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter,
supra note 68, at 13–14.
204. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468–69 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing “claim that
same-sex marriage will undermine . . . norms [that] . . . encourage people in opposite-sex
relationships to place their children’s interests above their own and preserve intact family
units, instead of pursuing their own emotional and sexual needs elsewhere” and “will
adversely affect opposite-sex marriage by reducing its appeal to heterosexuals, and will reduce
the chance that accidental pregnancy will lead to marriage”); Gallagher, supra note 176
(claiming that permitting same-sex couples to marry “would enshrine in law a public judgment
that the desire of adults for families of choice outweighs the need of children for mothers and
fathers” and “put our most basic social institution at risk”).
205. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606–07.
206. See Candice Norwood, Bathroom Bills: Yet Another Attempt to Use Women as a
Shield for Discrimination, VOX (Apr. 20, 2016, 9:20 AM), http://www.vox.com/identities/2016
/4/20/11420950/womens-safety-bathroom-bills [http://perma.cc/YK3T-79KP].
207. See Jeff Brady, When a Transgender Person Uses a Public Bathroom, Who Is at Risk?,
NPR (May 15, 2016, 7:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/15/477954537/when-a-transgenderperson-uses-a-public-bathroom-who-is-at-risk [http://perma.cc/8W46-PJ8C] (reporting that
one pastor suggested that a transgender woman might want to use the women’s restroom “to
look at the anatomy of the opposite sex . . . . because he’s a sex pervert . . . . [seeking] to bring
damage to a young girl”); Katy Steinmetz, Why LGBT Advocates Say ‘Predators’ Argument Is
a Red Herring, TIME (May 2, 2016), http://time.com/4314896/transgender-bathroom-billmale-predators-argument/ [http://perma.cc/XBH3-WTHE].
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transgender identity) in order to gain access to women’s restrooms for
improper purposes.208
In the marriage cases, most courts ultimately rejected arguments
based on the supposed vulnerability of women and children.209 These
courts held that permitting same-sex couples to marry furthered the core
purposes of marriage—including encouraging couples that have children
to enter into a committed family relationship.210 They rejected the notion
that giving equal protection to children of same-sex couples would
somehow undermine the connection between marriage and children,
dismissing such fears as irrational: “It is wholly illogical,” one court
observed, “to believe that state recognition of the love and commitment
between same-sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal
decisions of opposite-sex couples.”211 As the Supreme Court held in
Obergefell, those asserting such claims “have not shown a foundation for
the conclusion that allowing same-sex marriages will cause the harmful
outcomes they describe.”212
Similarly, it is likely that most courts will reject the equally
unfounded fear that treating transgender people equally will bring an

208. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist.’s Response in Opposition to
Intervenor Third-Party Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 200, at 22
(claiming that a school district “has an important interest in preventing biological males from
professing a female gender identity in order to enter female restrooms and locker rooms for
nefarious purposes”). In reality, however, this fear is unwarranted. Opponents have failed to
show any increase in public safety concerns in the many jurisdictions that protect transgender
people. See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg & Dani Stewart, 3 Myths That Shape the Transgender
Bathroom Debate, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/health
/transgender-bathroom-law-facts-myths/ [https://perma.cc/4XW6-LFTN] (disproving claims
that anti-discrimination protections covering gender identity “lead to attacks in public
facilities”). In contrast, studies have shown that transgender people are much more likely than
others to be harassed in public restrooms. See Brady, supra note 207.
209. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting arguments
suggesting “children of opposite-sex couples will be harmed” by same-sex marriages); Kitchen
v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We cannot embrace the contention that
children raised by opposite-sex parents fare better than children raised by same-sex
parents . . . .”).
210. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600; Latta, 771 F.3d at 473–74 (explaining that allowing
same-sex couples to marry provides resources and benefits to those families); Kitchen, 755
F.3d at 1226 (explaining how marriage benefits children and how allowing same-sex couples to
enter into marriage would provide the children of same-sex couples with financial and
emotional security).
211. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1223. In the federal district court decision striking down
Proposition 8 in California, the judge similarly found that barring same-sex couples from
marriage “does not make it more likely that opposite-sex couples will marry and raise
offspring biologically related to both parents.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012),
vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
212. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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end to gender-segregated restrooms. While some advocates have urged
that many people (both transgender and non-transgender) would benefit
from the availability of more gender-neutral restrooms,213 transgender
men and women generally seek to be integrated into gender-segregated
restrooms, not to abolish them.214 Moreover, they seek to do so on the
same terms and conditions as others.215 In practice, schools, businesses,
and employers do not require non-transgender persons to produce birth
certificates, medical records, or other evidence of their gender; rather, in
everyday life, individuals simply use the restrooms that correspond to
their lived identity as male or female. Transgender persons generally
wish to do the same—to be treated as the men and women they are.
In addition, just as any attempt to restrict marriage to persons
capable of biological procreation would create untenable—and blatantly
unconstitutional—intrusions into private matters, so any attempt to
restrict access to restrooms based on so-called “biological sex” would do
the same. In the marriage cases, courts noted that neither the ability nor
the desire to procreate has ever been a prerequisite for marriage.216
Further, imposing any such requirement would impermissibly burden
the privacy rights of individuals and couples, requiring unthinkable
governmental intrusions into the most personal and sensitive areas of
medical and decisional privacy.217
In the restroom cases, courts have recognized that litmus tests based
on so-called “biological sex” would create similar problems. In a recent
decision holding that public schools must permit transgender students to
use the same restrooms as other students, the Fourth Circuit noted that
a rule restricting access to gender-segregated restrooms based on a
person’s “biological sex” would raise a number of questions.218 For
instance, “which restroom would a transgender individual who had
213. See generally Kogan, supra note 6 (manuscript at 131–35) (discussing recent proposals
for gender neural restrooms).
214. See, e.g., Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (“All parties
agree that sex-segregated bathrooms, showers, and changing facilities promote important
State privacy interests, and neither Plaintiffs nor the United States contests the convention.”).
215. See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 20, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v.
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2056) (arguing to use the
restroom “just like any other boy would”), vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, __
S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755; Editorial Board, For Transgender Americans, Legal
Battles over Restrooms, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27
/opinion/for-transgender-americans-legal-battles-over-restrooms.html [https://perma.cc/N3X55SRP] (quoting Grimm’s statement that being able to use the same restrooms as other boys
would allow him to “be a normal child and use the restroom in peace”).
216. See Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1219.
217. Id. at 1222.
218. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719–20 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 855755.
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undergone sex-reassignment surgery use? What about an intersex
individual? What about an individual born with X-X-Y sex
chromosomes? What about an individual who had lost external genitalia
in an accident?”219 Moreover, any attempt to enforce such tests would
run into serious constitutional problems, exposing individuals to
untenable infringements of privacy and dignity.220
CONCLUSION
Just as most courts eventually rejected similar biology-based claims
in the marriage cases, most are likely to reject them in transgender cases
as well. Such claims may resonate with deeply held popular beliefs;
ultimately, however, they serve only to insulate exclusionary policies
from meaningful review and to obscure the actual choices and values
that underlie decisions to limit access to important social institutions to
certain groups. In schools, workplaces, and the public square, equal
access to public restrooms is a precondition of full participation in our
shared communal life. So long as transgender people are denied that
equal access, they cannot participate in the larger society on equal terms.
That inequality is not caused by biology, but by the choice to treat
transgender persons differently than others.
The alternative—to relegate transgender people to separate
restrooms—is as untenable as the now-rejected proposal to relegate
same-sex couples to a separate family law status other than marriage. In
both debates, those defending exclusionary policies argued that because
same-sex couples and transgender people differ from opposite-sex
couples and cisgender persons with respect to certain biological traits,
they should be given separate accommodations. In the marriage cases,
several states defended the provision of a separate legal status for samesex couples, arguing that states should be permitted to reserve the
institution of marriage for different-sex couples while providing a

219. Id. at 719–20.
220. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009) (holding that
school’s strip search of student was unreasonable); Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516
F.3d 489, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that school's videotaping of students in locker room
violated the Fourth Amendment). Some opponents of transgender equality argue that
permitting transgender students to use the same communal restrooms as others would violate
the privacy rights of other students. See, e.g., Duaa Eldeib, Judge Sides Against Parents Who
Want to Ban Transgender Student from Locker Room in District 211, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 16,
2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-transgender-studentlocker-room-palatine-20161018-story.html [https://perma.cc/V9T5-SBA4 (staff-uploaded
archive)]. For a response to those arguments, see Brief of Amici Curiae GLBTQ Legal
Advocates & Defenders et al. in Support of Respondent at 4–6, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v.
G.G., __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755.
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separate and yet substantively equal legal status for same-sex couples.221
But as courts recognized, relegating same-sex couples to a separate
status is inherently unequal.222
Similarly, in Grimm and many of the other pending cases involving
transgender students, school districts and those challenging equal
restroom policies argue that they should be permitted to provide
transgender students with separate facilities and that doing so is
sufficient to meet the requirement of equal protection.223 The arguments
against such an approach are similar to those against civil unions and
domestic partnerships: such a “solution” imposes inequality and stigma
by singling out transgender students for disparate treatment based on a
characteristic that has no relevance to their ability to use the same
restrooms as others, or more broadly, to participate in public life on
equal terms.
Perhaps in the not-too-distant future, the notion that our nation
once seriously debated whether to permit schools, employers, and
businesses to isolate transgender persons and treat them differently than
others will seem as antiquated to future generations as the marriage
equality debate seems to many young people today. If so, both our
nation and our democracy will be stronger for it.

221. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 n.2 (Cal. 2008) (“[C]urrent
California statutes grant same-sex couples who choose to become domestic partners virtually
all of the legal rights and responsibilities accorded married couples under California law.”),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.5 (2008); Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 413 (Conn. 2008) (noting enactment of law
“established the right of same sex partners to enter into civil unions and conferred on such
unions all the rights and privileges that are granted to spouses in a marriage”).
222. As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in Kerrigan,
[w]e do not doubt that the civil union law was designed to benefit same sex couples by
providing them with legal rights that they previously did not have. If, however, the
intended effect of a law is to treat politically unpopular or historically disfavored
minorities differently from persons in the majority or favored class, that law cannot
evade constitutional review under the separate but equal doctrine.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 444–46.
223. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35–38, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755; Bd. of Educ. of
Highland Local Sch. Dist.’s Response in Opposition to Intervenor Third-Party Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 200, at 22.

